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Abstract
Traditional approaches to tactical Computer Network Defence (CND), drawn from the lessons and doctrine of
conventional warfare, are based on a team of deployed security professionals countering the adversary’s cyber
forces. The concept of the adversary in cyberspace does not fit neatly into the conventional military paradigms.
Rather than fighting an identifiable foe, cyber adversaries are clandestine, indistinguishable from legitimate
users or external services, operate across state boundaries, and from safe havens that provide sanctuary from
prosecution. The defender also faces imbalances with rules of engagement and a severe disparity between the
cost of delivering the defence and the attackers ability to deliver an effect. These operational conditions are more
akin with Irregular Warfare (IW) than a conventional conflict.
This paper proposes a new approach to CND, based on a review of the literature on IW. Rather than fight the
battle alone, the CND team should concentrate efforts to persuade and empower network users to take
responsibility for protecting the organisation’s critical data. This approach seeks to apply the lessons learnt
from IW, where the resistance to the adoption of security best practices, intentional or otherwise, is the real
adversary. This approach appears more likely to deliver long term protection from the current cyber threats than
a process, which requires the identification and tracking of adversaries that are invisible and constantly
changing.
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INTRODUCTION
"Analogically, the guerrilla fights the war of the flea, and his military enemy suffers the dog’s disadvantages:
too much to defend; too small, ubiquitous, and agile an enemy to come to grips with. If the war continues long
enough … the dog succumbs to exhaustion and anaemia without ever having found anything on which to close
its jaws or to rake with its claws." (Taber 2002)
Conventional or regular warfare is a form of conflict between states that employs direct military operations to
defeat an adversary’s armed forces, destroy an adversary’s war-making capacity, or seize territory in order to
compel a change in an adversary’s government or policies (U.S. DoD, 2007). Irregular Warfare (IW) differs
from conventional warfare by its emphasis on the indirect approach, avoiding a direct military confrontation
(Mao 2001). Instead one party employs methods not sanctioned by international law or customs of war, such as
guerrilla warfare, terrorism, sabotage, subversion, criminal activities, and insurgency to subvert and exhaust the
opponent (U.S. DoD, 2010). IW replaces other terms previously used in U.S. doctrine, such as low-intensity
conflict‚ (LIC) and Asymmetrical Warfare, Operations Other Than War (OOTW) and 4th Generation Warfare
(U.S. DoD, 2006).
Sharp (1999) was first to suggest that "the open architecture of the Internet is ideally suited for asymmetrical
warfare”. Rattray and Healey (2011) recently recommended that the U.S. Department of Defense “should
analyse the dynamics of‚ irregular cyber warfare‚ as a major aspect of the development of cyber war doctrine
and operational concepts. This might drive internal procedures based on familiar concepts of irregular war,
rather than the arcane and poorly understood jargon of computer security”. Unfortunately Rattray and Healey
didn’t provide specifics. This research aims to address this.
This paper is organised into three sections: (1) a set of observations, from literature, on why the IW environment
and that experienced by CND operators is similar, that supports the observation by Sharp, (2) a proposed new
IW-like overarching approach to conducting CND, based on IW literature, and (3) a transferrable advice on the
conduct of CND based on IW experience, as recommended by Rattray and Healey.
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SIMILARITIES BETWEEN IW AND COMPUTER NETWORK DEFENCE (CND)
The Absence of a Front Line or Operational Boundary
IW presents no defined battleground, no vanguard, no walls, nor opposing forces fronts and flanks (Cassidy
2004). Absence of a front line means that there are no longer any safe rear areas and support echelons are as
much of a target as combat units (Hoffman 2006). With the introduction of necessary external interactions and
trust relationships through bring your own devices, mobile smart phones and cloud computing, critical
information is at rest and in motion inside and outside the traditional network boundary (see Fig 1). CND
approaches of treating the protection of a computer network like the defence of a hill is likely to become less
relevant (only allowing access to those inside the network, building perimeter defences, monitoring gateway
traffic and hiding critical servers behind locked doors).

Figure 1: Critical data is no longer managed only within the internally managed environment

Constant Conflict with Uncertainty Between Friend and Foe
Modern land warfare, until recently, was divided up into three distinct phases: pre-conflict, conflict and postconflict (Stockings, 2007). IW conflict rarely results in a single, rapid strike, and swift and victorious
campaigns. Instead the distinction between states of war and peace in IW conflict collapse, as conflicts lasting
months or years result in deadlocks, with neither side able to decisively conclude the conflict (Kiras 2008).
What results is an uncertain environment where every individual citizen or issue motived group has the potential
to become a friend or enemy, or both at different times during the course of the military engagement (Anderson
2011). Similarly, the Internet in its natural state contains both friendly and compromised hosts, and hostile and
neutral users, where neither state is permanent, guaranteed or absolute.
Organisations fighting an IW conflict have no interest in wearing military uniforms or other distinctive signs
(Parks, 2003) and disperse their forces into small, mobile combat teams to become invisible by blending in with
the local population to avoid identification and detection (U.S. DoD, 2005). Similarly, the Internet's architecture
makes the identity of, and the motivation for the intrusion extremely difficult to ascertain. A sophisticated attack
can be made to appear indistinguishable from legitimate users or external services (J. Hunker, et al, 2008) Often,
the perpetrators of such activities can only be inferred from the target based on circumstantial evidence (United
Nations, 2010). This allows criminals, insiders and nation states conducting limited intervention or exploitation
activities to hide their identity and intent from the defending force.
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Adversaries with the ability to adopt new technology and strategies
IW adversaries appear to be increasingly adaptive and sophisticated, able to outpace state-based militaries in the
dialectic and competitive learning cycle inherent to wars. Their size and structure allows them to adopt
technology earlier than traditional military structures and capability development (Hoffman, 2006). Similarly,
cyber criminals are able to exploit software vulnerabilities within hours of their public notification.
Predominance of Non-State Actors
Conventional military operations are generally conducted with an assumption that the indigenous populations
within the operational area are non-belligerents (U.S. DoD, 2007). Non-states actors, such as cybercriminals and
hackivists have adopted state-like cyber attack and exploitation capabilities; and have become the prevalent
threat on the Internet. Their operations have grown increasingly sophisticated, combining open source and
bespoke software that was once the realm nation-states. As a result, military defenders will need to plan to
defeat cyber threats coming from a number of different non-state sources, simultaneous to any traditional
military threats in there area of operations.
Rule of Engagement Disparity
IW conflict presents challenges when combatants conduct conflict from within third party non-combatant
infrastructure or employ violence indiscriminately to achieve their goals. This is in direct contravention to The
Hague Conventions of 18 October 1907 and the 1949 Geneva Conventions for the Protection of War Victims,
which define rules to protect non-combatants from unnecessary suffering. Similarly cyber security defenders are
bound by local and international laws, which their adversaries may not elect to observe, such as pivoting an
attack through a series of third party network hosts, or attacking a neutral service provider that may be hosting
military services, amongst other customer data, in order to achieve an effect. Defenders also have challenges
with electronic evidence collection and jurisdictions that make prosecution difficult. In addition, existing tracing
and offensive technologies that could deliver attribution or a response option (or the threat of deterrence) are
quite likely in conflict with domestic and international law (Gaycken, 2010).
Disproportionate Cost Between the Intruders and Defenders
The cost of IW is not equitable between combatants. There is a disproportionate cost between an improvised
explosive device and the costs of equipping an entire military force with additional vehicle and personnel
armour as well as sophisticated electronic equipment to detect and neutralise remote wireless detonation. In
early 2012, there were approximately 432,000 counterinsurgency forces in Afghanistan. In addition, the U.S.
spent over $100 billion per year on the conflict. Conversely, the Taliban, deployed less than one tenth of the
forces, and had annual revenues of $150 million (Jones, 2012).
CND operators require expertise in all of the systems and networking protocols employed by the military
organisation. The attacker has the distinct advantage of being able to choose the time and place of the attack and
only needs to be familiar with those components and protocols of the defender's network that are vital to the
offensive operation. In addition, the "price" an adversary pays for a capability-a tool or weapon-can be slight;
the cost and impact borne by the victim of his attack can be very high (Alexander, 2010).

CHALLENGES TO THE CURRENT CND APPROACH
Lack of Personnel
The traditional approach to CND focuses on the adversary, attempting to parry each cut and thrust as it was
identified. It allocates the responsibility for the protection of the critical information to a team of detection and
response specialists. An example of this approach is the Kill-Chains proposed by Hutchins, et al (2011).
This type of approach enables CND operators to identify patterns that link individual intrusions into broader
campaigns, they: (1) require CND operators (a limited resource) to lead the activity, and (2) would grow in
complexity requiring militaries to sink ever-increasing resources into the team protecting the data as the lack of
definable boundaries, the uncertainty between friend and foe and the rate of change in technology become
overwhelming.
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Figure 2: Conventional approaches to CND predominantly rely on the CND team
to protect the critical information

Not Addressing the Highest Priorities
While developing Kill-Chains can help to detect adversary attacks, adopting best security practices can
significantly reduce the risk of data loss to all cyber adversaries, regardless of origin or motivation. The
Australian Defence Signals Directorate (DSD) advise that the adoption of the first four control measures in the
Top 35 Mitigation Strategies would successfully counter 80% of the network intrusions that they have detected
on government systems (DSD, 2011).
The adoption of security controls measures is not necessarily directly aligned with organisational outcomes.
Adoption may result in restrictions on flexibility and/or ability to access, store and process data. They may
reduce work productivity, which in a military context could mean a delay to the delivery of vital information to
a tactical commander. For instance, DSD (2011) recommends that the most valuable two strategies to prevent
targeted intruders are to patch operating systems and third party applications. The challenge is that undertaking
this activity requires the system owners to: (1) accept a loss of service while the patch is applied, and (2) deploy
the patch without sufficient testing, potentially risking additional service interruptions. This needs to be
balanced with the security of the information on the network, the loss of which could impact the outcome of
future military activities, or partner relationships, if confidence is lost. Based on DSD’s research, making sure
that tactical users are comfortable with constant network outages to apply necessary software patches, and the
risk that there could be a further interruption due to an unlikely event of a software conflict as a result of rapid
deployment of the patch and limited testing, is more likely to defeat both nation-state and cyber IW threats than
building a team with skills in tactical network forensics.
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A PROPOSED IW-LIKE APPROACH TO CND
The current U.S. Military IW definition is "a violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy
and influence over a specific population" U.S. Department of Defense 2010). The proposed IW-like approach to
CND considers the CND operator’s own network users as the target “population” and the insurgency as the
resistance to adopt best practices to protect data security. The IW-like approach to CND focuses CND operator
effort on working directly with the network users to create an environment where network users are driving the
adoption of security policies because they want to protect their data, dramatically increasing the size of the
defenders protecting the network (see Fig 3).

Figure 3: An IW-like approach to CND empowers the users and expands the number of people actively
protecting the critical data
Resistance to the adoption of best practices could be as a result of apathy, indifference or a lack of
understanding of the threat or impact of the users’ activities (or lack thereof) on the organisation. The IW goal,
therefore is to identify the source of the resistance and apply IW best practice to modify network user behaviour
and attitudes.

APPLYING LESSONS FROM IRREGULAR WARFARE TO CND
Small steps
U.S. Field Manual (FM) 3-24, Counterinsurgency, recommends that IW forces do not “try to crack the hardest
nut first - do not go straight for the main insurgent stronghold or try to take on villages that support insurgents.”
Instead, the manual recommends that IW forces “start from secure areas and work gradually outwards… Go
with, not against, the grain of the local populace. First, win the confidence of a few villages, and then work with
those with whom they trade, intermarry, or do business…achieving steady progress toward a set of reasonable
5

expectations may increase the populace’s tolerance for the inevitable inconveniences entailed by on-going [IW]
operations”.
While the temptation could be to commence an organisation wide programme to address the results of an audit
or penetration test, the initial engagement should start with supportive users and system owners. Success could
allow for further measures to be applied with this same group, or, depending on the path of least resistance start
an engagement in a new area using the introductions and support from the first.
User Empowerment
U.S. doctrine, FM 3-0, Operations, states that: “winning battles and engagements is important but alone is not
sufficient. Shaping the civil situation is just as important to success.” Kilcullen (2009) adds: “environment of
cooperation needs to be developed, relying on a close and genuine partnership that puts the Host Nation forces
in the lead”. Ultimately the data on the network is from or for the user, and not as a direct result of the efforts of
the IT security staff. Rather than adopting the control measure of highest priority first, allow the system owners
to drive the pace and direction of the change. Working with the users to understand their priorities is more likely
to yield success, and give the users a sense of ownership that can lead to self governance of data protection, as
opposed to dictating the implementation from a prioritised list, based on a generic organisation-wide risk
assessment. The latter only results in the continual requirement to invest in internal policing resources
(compliance) and the growth of the resistance to further policies.
Live amongst the population
Jones (2012) states that: “The best way to win over the population and isolate the insurgents is to live among the
population” This suggests that CND operators develop a clear appreciation of the activities that the users
undertake and the conditions under which they operate. Too often the IT or IT security staff operate in isolation
from the majority of the user community, without a clear understanding of the business of the organisation and
when security policy is decreed across the organisation that impacts on the operational activities of users, it is
understandably met with resistance and confusion.
Intelligence led operation
FM 3-24 states that: “IW is an intelligence-driven endeavour.” The manual recommends the employment of
standard intelligence processes to understand the operational environment, with emphasis on the populace, host
nation, and insurgents in order to best address the issues driving the insurgency.
As per a traditional adversary-focussed CND approach, there is a requirement to monitor and understand the
threat actor’s capabilities. However, in addition, the IW approach also develops an understanding of the internal
organisation. Assessments should be made to identify pockets or resistance, the extent of the resistance to
change, the basis for why controls cannot be adopted, and “safe havens” or enclaves within the organisation that
operate independent to the enterprise environment. In industry terms this could be specialist IT systems that
have been delivered as a trial or have their own autonomy.
Response force supported by long-term reconstruction resources
Galula (2006) outlines a seven-step process for counterinsurgents. The first two stages are: expel insurgents
followed by emplacing static forces. The static forces are provided to work with the community to ensure that it
is able to start to return to normalcy and eventually, take responsibility for its own protection. The latter is not
something that is not usually immediately achievable, but requires a long-term commitment from the IW force.
When a cyber security incident occurs, it is important to not only deploy the response capability, but also
allocate sufficient resources to remain engaged with the impacted users over a sustained period of time. This
requires a CND force balance comprising of an incident response team that is continually reactive to incidents
supported by a much larger team that has the ability to work with the system owner to address the root cause of
the incident and minimise the risk of a reoccurrence. The long-term support team needs to be capable of
addressing policy and procedural short falls as well as capable of project managing the delivery of technical
controls measures, such as installation of additional hardware and software or the migration of data. Like IW
operations, this support team needs to have the ability to engage the users in a language that the users are able to
understand; liaison and project management skills may not necessarily be the focus of conventional CND
training.
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Irwin (2009) recommends that the best leaders should be chosen to conduct a direct and long-term engagement
activities, as they are likely to have the greater impact on the long-term strategy of compliance and self-support,
rather than the response force. This strategy differs from traditional approaches where more capable staff may
have been allocated to the higher profile incident response team.
Faster pace of adoption and greater agility
A recurrent theme throughout IW literature is the side that learns faster and adapts more rapidly - the better
learning organisation usually wins (Nagl 2005, Luttwak 2006 and U.S. DoD 2007). Cyber security is constantly
in a state of change. Software vulnerabilities are continually identified and computer networks are typically
forever in a state of re-engineering and flux. Maintaining pace with technological, as well as procedural changes
requires the willingness and the organisational structure to undertake continual improvement.
CND teams need to include sufficient resources to monitor IW requirements, such as changes in the
organisation, the network and the operational environment as well as traditional CND adversary focussed
intelligence and research. Cost effective delivery of general open-source intelligence can be provided through
subscription to existing civilian authorities. Similarly, tactical CND operators can leverage off strategic agencies
for more military specific content. Adoption of new technologies also requires the ability to learn and apply
within a tactical environment. Time to undertake this activity, in addition to normal combat operations can be
challenging, but is essential to ensure that best practices are adopted.
Offensive action
The combination of offensive and defensive actions is integral to the success of IW (U.S. DoD 2005). Offensive
action in CND IW terms refers to the delivery of more active measures to encourage support of efforts to
empower the users to secure their data. Offensive actions could include the delivery / production of awareness
programmes, user training, penetration testing, compliance audits, threat assessments, active demonstrations,
incident summary reports and CND intelligence reports. Offensive actions should be considered for areas or
individuals that continue to resist the adoption of best security practices, or impact on the ability of existing
agreed programmes, without reasonable cause.
FM 3-24 states that where possible small measured actions should be undertaken, rather than large-scale
campaigns; “sometimes, the more force that is used, the less effective it is”. Ultimately the aim is to raise
awareness of the threats in a manner that fosters a desire to protect critical data, without the need for continual
coercion. The key, as it is with IW, is to know when more effort is required, and when it might be counter
productive. Over exuberance without consideration for the operational considerations could result in a loss of
credibility, which could create even greater resistance to the current proposals and present barriers for the
adoption of future changes.

CONCLUSION
“The American military culture regarded Vietnam as an aberration, or, an exotic interlude between the wars
that really count. The Army simply performed its conventional warfare repertoire in Vietnam even though it was
frequently irrelevant to the situation” (Jenkins, 1970).
Defence personnel are much more likely to understand their role in cyber conflict if they are told to build cyber
walls and conduct cyber patrols of their environment looking for their natural adversary (Nye 2011). The
challenge for militaries is that the cyber environment does not have defined areas of operation and front lines,
nor does it have defined nation-state actors. This paper proposes an IW-like approach to the challenges of CND,
based on an idea proposed by Rattray and Healey (2011). The proposed IW-like approach to CND considers the
CND operator’s own network users as the target “population” and the insurgency as the resistance to adopt best
practices to protect data security, whether that be institutional, intentional or as a result of a misunderstanding.
The IW-like approach to CND focuses CND operator effort on working directly with the network users to create
an environment where network users are driving the adoption of security policies because they want to protect
their data. Useful lessons from IW include: (1) addressing supportive areas first and grow support for the
adoption of policy, rather than focus on areas of the organisation that might have the greatest need, (2) allow the
network users to drive the pace of the change, (3) create a separate team that works with the users after an
incident to hep them address the policy or technical root cause, (4) allocate a greater level of CND training
effort to project management and interpersonal skills, (5) appoint the most talented CND staff to undertake the
outreach and remediation programmes, rather than incident response, (6) resource agility, and (7) monitor, and
where required, take action on areas that resist the adoption of key reforms.
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